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Abstract
Numerous works in the last decade have analyzed the question
of how to compare opportunity sets as a way to measure and evalu-
ate individual freedom of choice. This paper defends that, in many
contexts, external procedural aspects that are associated to an op-
portunity set should be taken into account when making judgements
about the freedom of choice an agent enjoys. We propose criteria
for comparing procedure-based opportunity sets that are consistent
with both the procedural aspect of freedom and most of the standard
theories of ranking opportunity sets.
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1 Introduction and Motivation
According to the libertarian tradition rooted by J. S. Mill (1859) and more
recently developed by R. Nozick (1974), the exercise of freedom of choice
enriches human individual faculties and is a necessary condition for a life to
be considered as a “meaningful” life. In this sense, the value of freedom of
choice is independent of individual preferences about the options to choose
from and, therefore, it can only be captured by means of a non-welfaristic
approach.
In particular, several authors have been concerned with the inadequacy
of the standard theory of consumer behavior to display properly the value of
freedom of choice. According to the standard view which evaluates budget
sets by means of their indirect utility, an opportunity set of an arbitrary large
number of alternatives is always declared by any agent as good as another
opportunity set consisting uniquely of its best alternative in terms of that
agent’s preferences. Therefore, there is neither a positive nor a normative dif-
ference between choosing autonomously an alternative “x” from a large set of
options, and being constrained (or even, obliged) to choose “x”. This means
that if we are concerned with measuring and evaluating the intrinsic value
of freedom, opportunity sets should be evaluated in a different way. This
has been the main motivation for many proposals in the last years to rank
opportunity sets consistent with the assumption that freedom of choice is
desirable farther away than due to welfaristic reasons (see, among many oth-
ers Arlegi and Nieto (2001a,b), Bossert (1997, 2000), Bossert, Pattanaik, and
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Xu (1994), Foster (1992), Gravel (1998), Jones and Sugden (1982), Klemisch-
Ahlert (1993), Pattanaik and Xu (1990, 1998, 2000), Puppe (1995, 1996), and
Sugden (1998)).
In all mentioned works the central object of formal analysis is that of
an opportunity set: the set of (mutually exclusive) alternatives enjoyed by
the decision maker. Then, comparisons and rankings over opportunity sets
are defined, axiomatically characterized, and discussed on the basis of the
information provided by the sets. In many of those works the comparisons
are also made on the basis of the information given by the agent’s preferences
over the basic alternatives. Other works like Jones and Sugden (1982), Pat-
tanaik and Xu (1998) or Sugden (1998) do not consider the actual preferences
of the agent but the set of reasonable preferences: “those preferences that
reasonable people would have in the position of the agent whose freedom we
are trying to evaluate”. In any case, the opportunity set availed by an agent,
together with certain specification of his/her preferences (actual, potential
or reasonable), are assumed to contain all the relevant information to make
judgements about the individual’s freedom.
However, there are numerous situations in which the set of available op-
portunities for the agent and his/her preferences do not capture certain cir-
cumstances that might be relevant in order to make positive or normative
judgements about the freedom of choice that an agent enjoys when confronted
to a certain opportunity set. Very often, certain decision circumstances ex-
ternal to the specification of the set of opportunities affect our perception of
the freedom provided by the set. We could mention the following:
• The procedure that generates the alternatives in the set. For example,
Gaertner and Xu (2004) stress the technological aspect. Many people
would be willing to shrink their budget set in order to avoid consum-
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ing goods produced in ”unfair” conditions, such as the exploitation
of children in underdeveloped countries, or highly contaminating tech-
nologies. From a more general point of view, one might be interested in
considering the ethical desirability of a political system that facilitated
a particular set of alternative life plans.
• The way preferences over the alternatives have been formed. For ex-
ample, in order to evaluate the freedom to choose a government in the
elections, apart from the availability of different political options, it
might be relevant to consider whether individuals have well-informed
preferences or are to some extent coerced, manipulated or persuaded.
The same is applicable for the choice of alternative ways to proceed in
a conflictive situation.
• The distributive aspect of freedom. Even from the individual point of
view, one’s feeling of freedom to choose may depend on whether or not
others are also free to do so. To a big extent, the idea of freedom is
conditioned by the social environment. Having the possibility to read
a newspaper every day, even if it is only one, can be considered as a
privilege in certain underdeveloped areas, while being a situation of
restriction of freedom in other context, such as the case of a prisoner
in a developed country.
• The procedure for making the final choice. The mere act of choosing
might involve more or less freedom depending on certain procedural
aspects, such as bureaucratic barriers, the degree of anonymity in the
choice (for example whether voting is secret or not), and others.
• The degree of negative freedom. In certain situations, in order to make
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judgments about it may be more important to know which things the
agent cannot do, than which he can. And even more important, the rea-
sons why an agent may be unable to choose certain options. This idea
leads to the notion of negative freedom; what the agent cannot do, due
to the encroachment by others. Barbera`, Bossert and Pattanaik (2004)
propose the following example: It may be relevant to know whether a
person can or cannot choose to be a football player in his life, but it
may be more relevant for the purpose of evaluating freedom to know
whether he is unable to be a football player because of some physical
handicap or because he is black and the local law prevents blacks from
playing football. The concept of negative freedom is deeply explored
by Berlin (1969) and recently developed by Van Hees (1998) in the
context of opportunity sets comparisons. The mere opportunity set
available by an agent cannot display any information about options
that are not in the opportunity set, and even less, about which are the
reasons why those options are not available. However, it seems rea-
sonable that the options that one cannot choose, and the reasons why
they are not choosable, are aspects to be considered when evaluating
individual freedom.
• The degree of reversibility in the final choice: For example, the choice
of who to marry might be considered more or less free according to
whether or not divorce is possible.
One could argue that we are trying to introduce aspects in the evaluation
of freedom that are out of the sphere of what actually is freedom of choice.
That is, one could defend that the freedom of choice enjoyed by an agent
is uniquely determined by what the agent can choose. Therefore, how the
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set was generated or which is the set of non-available options, or how the
final choice has to be made are all of them aspects that concern other things
different to the actual freedom of choice provided by the opportunity set.
In a sense, this discussion is not new: Pattanaik and Xu (1990) propose
the cardinalist rule to rank opportunity sets, that simply takes the number
of alternatives in the set as an index of the freedom that it provides. They
characterize the cardinalist ranking as an elegant consequence of very simple
axioms. Their proposal can be considered as the barest measurement of
freedom in the sense that, if we are concerned with freedom of choice, we
should just count the number of options. Sen (1991, 1993a) defends that any
evaluation of the overall freedom provided by a set should take into account
also the preferences of the agent over the alternatives. From our point of
view, the introduction of preferences implies a deviation from the purest
description of freedom that Pattanaik and Xu (1990) provide. However, by
following Sen, and considering the preferences over the alternatives (actual
or potential) we gain a better accomplishment with the natural and practical
meaning of overall freedom of choice.
In other words, our proposal to incorporate certain procedural aspects
to evaluate freedom of choice also deviates from the purest account of free-
dom, but we believe that it contributes also to a better theory of comparing
opportunity sets in terms of overall freedom.
In sum, we will distinguish between two aspects of freedom of choice:
• objective freedom - the freedom of choice provided by the mere avail-
ability of certain alternatives over which there are defined certain pref-
erences. In this sense, all works mentioned above propose rules to com-
pare opportunity sets that measure and evaluate objective freedom;
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• procedural freedom - the freedom provided by any other external refer-
ence out of the set of alternatives and individual preferences like the
procedure that generates the set, the way the final choice is made or any
other external circumstance that we might consider relevant in terms
of freedom of choice.
Another possible way to formally approach the problem could be by at-
taching the procedural information to the alternatives, rather than to the
opportunity sets. That is, by considering any given opportunity (for exam-
ple, “voting party A”), as a multiplicity of alternatives depending of the
external reference. So that, one could consider “voting party A under co-
ercion” as a different alternative of “voting party A under persuasion” or
“voting party A under freely formed preferences”. This is the kind of ap-
proach we find in some works as Sen (1993b), and might be adequate under
certain meanings of the external reference. In this paper we consider external
references that are associated to the act of choosing from any opportunity
set, rather than to the specific alternatives. For that reason it seems more
adequate to describe the reference as associated to the set, rather than to
the particular alternatives.
In trying to capture both the objective and the procedural aspects of free-
dom we have organized the rest of the paper as follows. Section 2 is devoted
to our basic notation and definitions, and it introduces the procedure-based
opportunity sets as our basic analytical tool. In Section 3 we consider freedom
preserving relations of procedure-based opportunity sets, i.e. relations which
satisfy two axioms: objective freedom preservation and procedural freedom
preservation. These relations are characterized as being extensions of a spe-
cial partial ordering defined over the family of procedure-based opportunity
sets. We introduce the notion of a procedural extension of a given binary
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relation over non-procedure-based opportunity sets in Section 4 and present
the connection between such a procedural extension and the set inclusion
relation defined over the set of basic alternatives. In Section 5 two particular
classes of procedural extensions of freedom preserving relations are consid-
ered: a first one that prioritizes the procedural aspect over the ranking on
(non-procedure-based) opportunity sets, and a second one that prioritizes
the ranking on (non-procedure-based) opportunity sets over the procedure.
We present two axioms which, together with the corresponding axioms char-
acterizing the relations on (non-procedure-based) opportunity sets, produce
a characterization of the relation of procedure-based opportunity sets. Pro-
cedural extensions of the cardinalist ranking (see Pattanaik and Xu (1990))
and of the leximax ranking (see Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu (1994)) of op-
portunity sets are exemplified as well. We present some final remarks and
conclusions in Section 6.
2 Framework
Let X be a non-empty and finite set of alternatives, and X be the set of
all non-empty subsets of X. We will denote the elements of X by A,B . . ..
The interpretation of each element of X is that of an (non-procedure-based)
opportunity set.
Let Π be a non-empty finite set of procedures. The elements of Π represent
the different states of a certain category (procedure) that affect the value of
an opportunity set. According to the examples in the previous section, the
set Π may collect the different technologies that generate an opportunity set;
the different procedures by which the final option can be chosen; the different
ways the preferences are formed; the different distributions of freedom over
8
individuals; the different degrees of reversability of the final choice, or other
states of any procedural aspect that we consider relevant to be taken into
account in order to evaluate opportunity sets. We do not advocate to any
particular interpretation. We will simply assume that such a set exists and
that the elements in Π are linearly ordered according to their desirability
in terms of the procedural freedom of choice they attach to an opportunity
set. More precisely, we assume the existence of a complete, transitive and
antisymmetric binary relation R ⊆ Π × Π, reading, for all i, j ∈ Π, iRj
as “given an opportunity set, procedure i attaches to it at least as much
procedural freedom as procedure j”. The corresponding strict preference and
indifference are denoted by P and I, respectively1.
As far as we are interested in evaluating both the objective and procedural
freedom provided by an opportunity set, we are interested in elements (A, i)
of K = X × Π, which will be called procedure-based opportunity sets. Each
element (A, i) of K will be interpreted as “opportunity set A associated to
1 The foundations to establish the particular estates of a certain procedu-
ral category and the corresponding rankings over them are out of the scope
of this paper. However, such a question is of big interest. For example, one
could (roughly) approach the degree of freedom in the formation of prefer-
ences by means of the number of years of education, or the degree of negative
freedom by means of the number of alternatives that are forbidden to the
decision maker (see Van Hees (1998) and Steiner (1983)). Also, some works
analyze rankings of social situations in terms of the equality in the distri-
bution of opportunities they provide (see, among others, Arlegi and Nieto
(1999), Bossert, Fleurbaey, and Van de Gaer (1999), Gravel, Laslier, and
Trannoy (1998), Herrero, Iturbe-Ormaetxe, and Nieto (1998), or Ok and
Kranich (1998)).
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procedure i”. According to the particular interpretation we may apply to Π,
the term “associated to” can be substituted by more particular expressions
such as “conditioned by” or, as in Gaertner and Xu (2004), “generated by”.
We will assume that all elements in K are potentially feasible, i.e. that any
element in X can be associated to any element in Π.
Comparisons of procedure-based opportunity sets will be represented by
a binary relation %+ defined on K. For all (A, i) , (B, j) ∈ K, (A, i) %+ (B, j)
should be read as “set A, when associated to procedure i, is weakly preferred
in terms of overall freedom to set B, when associated to procedure j”. The
asymmetric and symmetric parts of %+ will be denoted by Â+ and ∼+,
respectively.
3 Freedom Preserving Relations over Procedure-
Based Opportunity Sets
In this section, we introduce two axioms for %+⊆ K×K which can be seen as
minimal requirements imposed on it in order to preserve the overall freedom.
• Objective Freedom Preservation (OF): For all A,B ∈ X and all i ∈ Π,
[B ⊂ A]⇒ [(A, i) Â+ (B, i)].
• Procedural Freedom Preservation (PF): For all i, j ∈ Π and all A ∈ X ,
[iRj]⇔ [(A, i) %+ (A, j)].
(OF) establishes that a procedure-based opportunity set is always bet-
ter than another procedure-based opportunity set provided that the first
(non-procedure-based) opportunity set includes the second one, and that the
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associated procedure is the same. This axiom is a translation to our con-
text of a common property in the works that consider the intrinsic value of
freedom of choice. According to that property, any increasing in the number
of the opportunities to choose from leads to an expansion of the freedom of
choice. So that (OF) maintains, ceteris paribus, such a principle.
(PF) declares that an opportunity set associated to a given procedure as
better in terms of overall freedom than the same set associated to another
procedure if and only if the first procedure provides at least as much proce-
dural freedom as the second one. In other words, (PF) states that, ceteris
paribus, it is the procedural aspect that matters.
Definition 1 Let %+⊆ K × K. We will say that %+ is a freedom pre-
serving relation if it satisfies (PF) and (OF).
Clearly, (PF) and (OF) together only determine a partial ordering on K,
according to which we only know how to rank sets that are related by set
inclusion when they are associated to the same procedure, and how to rank
identical sets when they are associated to different procedures. But (OF)
and (PF) do not allow to know anything about how to rank opportunity sets
that are associated to the same procedure but not related by set inclusion;
or opportunity sets that are associated to different procedures and related by
set inclusion; or opportunity sets that are associated to different procedures
but not related by set inclusion.
The way a relation on procedure-based opportunity sets solves the trade-
offs mentioned above will depend on the particular values and importance
that an individual or a society assigns to the procedures and to the availability
of the different particular opportunities. We could think of individuals or
societies for whom (which) the procedure is fundamental and there is no
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objective freedom that might compensate a better procedure. Or we can
imagine a system of values that just considers the number of opportunities
available, no matter the way the opportunity set is reached or generated.
Several standard orderings of opportunity sets, such as the leximax rule (see
Bossert, Pattanaik, and Xu (1994)) or the cardinalist one (see Pattanaik and
Xu (1990)), are useful as a guide to possible solutions for the trade-offs of the
first type (same procedure and opportunity sets not related by set inclusion),
but at this point we do not know anything about how to manage the other
kinds of trade-offs in which procedural aspects take place.
In what follows we propose a representation result for the class of free-
dom preserving relations on procedure-based opportunity sets. In order to
elaborate on this point, we will make use of the following setup.
For the set X let σX be any fixed permutation of the elements of X the
result of which is X = {x1, . . . , xn}. Let f : X → <++ be any function
assigning positive real numbers to the alternatives in X, and let v : Π→ <+
be a procedural value function representing R (that is, such that for all i, j ∈
Π, v(i) ≥ v(j)⇔ iRj).
Let u : X → <n++ be such that for all A ∈ X , u(A) = (u1, . . . , un), where,
for i = 1, . . . , n,
ui =
 f(xi) if xi ∈ A,0 otherwise.
Let U : K → <n+1++ be such that for all (A, k) ∈ K, U(A, k) = (U1, . . . , Un+1),
where for i ≤ n, Ui = ui and for i = n+ 1, ui = v(k).
Let ≥ denote the “greater or equal” relation defined on <n+1++ . Based on
the construction above, we can define the following partial ordering %∗ on
K:
For all (A, i) , (B, j) ∈ K, (A, i) %∗ (B, j)⇔ U (A, i) ≥ U (B, j) .
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We will denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts of %∗ by Â∗ and ∼∗,
respectively.
A question that naturally arises is about the connection between %∗ and
relations on procedure-based opportunity sets. More specifically, our first
result investigates the conditions under which a relation %+ over procedure-
based opportunity sets can be seen as an extension of %∗, that is, (1)
[(A, i) Â∗ (B, j)]⇒ [(A, i) Â+ (B, j)], and (2) [(A, i) ∼∗ (B, j)]⇒ [(A, i) ∼+ (B, j)].
Theorem 1 Let %+⊆ K × K. Then, %+ is a freedom preserving relation if
and only if it is an extension of %∗.
In order to prove this theorem we will need the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1 For all A,B ∈ X and all i, j ∈ Π,
[U(A, i) > U(B, j)]⇒ [{B ⊂ A and iRj} or {B = A and iP j}] .
Proof. Suppose not. Then there are four logical possibilities:
(i) ¬(B ⊆ A). Then, there exists xi ∈ B such that xi /∈ A, and therefore
¬(U(A, i) > U(B, j)), which is a contradiction.
(ii) jP i and B 6= A. But jP i implies ¬(U(A, i) > U(B, j)), which is a
contradiction.
(iii) ¬(B ⊂ A) and jRi. If B = A then (U(B, j) ≥ U(A, i)). If B 6=
A then there exists xi ∈ B such that xi /∈ A, and therefore ¬(U(A, i) >
U(B, j)). In both cases we get a contradiction.
(iv) jP i. As in (ii) that implies ¬(U(A, i) > U(B, j)), again a contradic-
tion.
Lemma 2 For all A,B ∈ X and all i, j ∈ Π,
[U(A, i) = U(B, j)]⇒ [B = A and iIj] .
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Proof. Suppose not. Then B 6= A or ¬(iIj). Both possibilities, by the
construction of U , imply ¬(U(A, i) = U(B, j)), which is a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 1. ⇒ We have to prove that if %+ is a freedom preserving
relation (i.e. it satisfies (PF) and (OF)), then for all A,B ∈ X and all i, j ∈
Π : (1) [(A, i) Â∗ (B, j)] ⇒ [(A, i) Â+ (B, j)], and (2) [(A, i) ∼∗ (B, j)] ⇒
[(A, i) ∼+ (B, j)].
(1) Note that, by the definition of %∗, (A, i) Â+ (B, j) implies (U(A, i) >
U(B, j)), which by Lemma 1 implies (a) B ⊂ A and iRj or (b) B = A and
iP j.
(1.a) If iIj then, by (OF), (A, i) Â+ (B, j). If iP j then, by (PF),
(A, i) Â+ (A, j). Again, by (OF), (A, j) Â+ (B, j). Finally, transitivity
of Â+ implies (A, i) Â+ (B, j).
(1.b) If B = A and iP j then, by (PF) (A, i) Â+ (B, j).
(2) In this case, by construction of %∗ and by Lemma 2, (A, i) ∼∗ (B, j)
implies B = A and iIj. Since R is a linear ordering, by reflexivity of %+,
(A, i) ∼+ (B, j).
⇐We have to prove that if the implications [(A, i) Â∗ (B, j)]→ [(A, i) Â+ (B, j)]
and [(A, i) ∼∗ (B, j)] → [(A, i) ∼+ (B, j)] hold, then %+ satisfies (OF) and
(PF).
Suppose ¬(OF). Then there exists A,B ∈ X and i ∈ Π such that B ⊂ A
and (B, i) %+ (A, i). But B ⊂ A, by construction of U , implies U(A, i) >
U(B, i). Therefore, by the definition of %∗, (A, i) Â∗ (B, i) and by hypothesis
(A, i) Â+ (B, i), a contradiction.
Suppose ¬(PF). Then there exists A ∈ X and i, j ∈ Π such that (1)
(A, i) %+ (A, j) and jP i, or (2) iRj and (A, j) Â+ (A, i).
(1) If jP i, then (A, j) Â+ (A, i). Therefore (A, j) Â∗ (A, i), which is a
contradiction.
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(2) In this case there are two possibilities: (a) iP j and (A, j) Â+ (A, i),
and (b) iIj and (A, j) Â+ (A, i).
(2.a) By the definition of %+ and the construction of U , this case implies
U(A, j) > U(A, i). Therefore, by the definition of %∗, (A, j) Â∗ (A, i). Then,
by hypothesis (A, i) Â+ (A, j), a contradiction.
(2.b) By the construction of U this case implies U(A, j) = U(A, i).
Therefore, by the definition of %∗, (A, j) ∼∗ (A, i). Then, by hypothesis
(A, i) ∼+ (A, j), which is a contradiction.
We can interpret Theorem 1 as if the availability of any opportunity x
had certain positive value f(x), and the procedural aspect i associated to
the set had also certain value v(i) given by the linear ordering R defined
over procedures. Then, (OF) and (PF) do not provide clues about how to
aggregate such values, but they at least ensure that any relation that, ceteris
paribus, preserve both the procedural aspect of freedom and the objective
aspect of freedom, respects the dominance relation over vectors of the form
given by the function U .
In order to know more about which are those values we would need to
have a richer informational basis. For example, concerning the values of f
and v, Theorem 1 just establishes that they are strictly positive. Very often
in the literature on rankings over opportunity sets we find the assumption of
the existence of a binary relation defined on X, representing the quality of
the basic alternatives. In such a case, very plausibly, the information of such
a relation could be incorporated in f . Moreover, some (complete) rankings
of that literature fit well with particular ways to aggregate the values of f in
order to obtain numerical representations of that rankings. A clear example
would be Pattanaik and Xu’s (1990) cardinalist ranking, which could be
understood as if the decision maker made a simple addition of the (equal)
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values of the alternatives in the set.
However, the purpose of this work is neither to suggest and characterize
particular ways of defining those values, nor to provide formulae to aggre-
gate them in order to represent particular rankings. In the next sections we
will make use of the characterization results of relations over (non-procedure-
based) opportunity sets, that are well established in the literature, and pro-
vide a general guide that allows to import these results into our procedural
framework.
4 Procedural Extensions of Relations over Op-
portunity Sets
As suggested in the Introduction, the rules for comparing opportunity sets
that can be found in the literature ignore the procedural aspects or, put
more positively, such rules are proposed as if the procedures associated to
the different opportunity sets in X were the same. Keeping in mind this
positive interpretation, any binary relation defined on X can be seen, for any
i ∈ Π, as a binary relation defined on Xi = {(A, i) ∈ K : (A, i) ∈ X × {i}}.
Then we naturally have K = X × Π = ∪i∈ΠXi.
Related to the idea above, we introduce two new concepts by means of
the following definitions.
Definition 2 Let %⊆ X × X. Let i ∈ Π and %i⊆ Xi × Xi. We say that
%i is a procedural replication of % if for all A,B ∈ X , [A % B] ⇔
[(A, i) %i (B, i)].
Definition 3 Let %⊆ X × X and %+⊆ K × K. We will say that %+ is a
16
procedural extension of % if and only if for all i ∈ Π and all procedural
replications %i of %, %i⊂%+.
Definition 2 just allows to replicate a given binary relation defined on
(non-procedure-based) opportunity sets to a framework in which all those
opportunity sets are associated to the same procedure. Concerning Defini-
tion 3, given a certain binary relation defined on opportunity sets, a proce-
dural extension of it maintains such binary relation across procedures. Of
course, the procedural extensions of a given relation over opportunity sets
form a subclass of the possible relations over procedure-based opportunity
sets. We could find examples in which the particular procedure affects the
preferences over sets: for example, a too bureaucratic procedure might bias
the preferences in favor of smaller sets. In other words, if %+ is a procedural
extension of %, then such kinds of framing effects are ruled out.
As we will see below, there is a natural relationship between %+ as being
a procedural extension of % and satisfying (OF) on the one hand, and % as
being an extension of the set inclusion relation on X on the other hand (i.e.
for all A,B ∈ X we have [B ⊂ A]⇒ [A Â B]).
Theorem 2 Let % be a reflexive binary relation defined on X . Let %+ be
a procedural extension of %. Then %+ satisfies (OF) if and only if % is an
extension of the set inclusion relation.
Proof. ⇒ We have to prove that if %+ is a procedural extension of % and
satisfy (OF) then % is an extension of the set inclusion relation.
Take B ⊂ A. By (OF) (A, i) Â+ (B, i) for all i ∈ Π. Given that %+ is a
procedural extension of %, we have A Â B.
⇐ Let %+ be a procedural extension of %, and let % be an extension of
the set inclusion relation. Then [B ⊂ A] ⇒ [A Â B] ⇒ [(A, i) Â+ (B, i)], as
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required in order to demonstrate that %+ satisfies (OF).
In the next section we investigate two particular types of freedom preserv-
ing relations that are procedural extensions of a given underlying relation %.
Since any freedom preserving relation satisfies (OF) (in addition to (PF)),
Theorem 2 implies that the underlying relation % has to be an extension of
the set inclusion relation.
5 Some Particular Procedural Extensions
Given a relation % defined on the set of non-empty opportunity sets, we
will concentrate on two particular procedural extensions of %. The first rule
prioritizes the value of the procedure over the objective value given by %.
The second rule ranks procedure-based opportunity sets according to the
value given by %, and only when the sets are indifferent according to %,
considers better the set which is associated to a better procedure.
In order to introduce these rules more precisely, let us consider the fol-
lowing axioms:
• Procedure Priority (PP): For all i, j ∈ Π, and for all A,B ∈ X , [iP j]⇒
[(A, i) Â+ (B, j)].
• Objective Relation Priority (ORP): Let % be a binary relation de-
fined on X . Then for all A,B ∈ X and all i, j ∈ Π, [A Â B] ⇒
[(A, i) Â+ (B, j)].
(PP) says that if a certain procedure i is strictly better than another
procedure j, then that is a sufficient condition to establish that any set
associated to i is better than any set associated to j. (ORP) says that
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whenever an opportunity set A is considered strictly better than another
opportunity set B according to %, that is a sufficient condition to assert that,
when ranking procedure-based opportunity sets, A is going to be better than
B, regardless the procedures which are associated to these sets.
In the previous section we suggested that the way of solving the trade-offs
between the procedural aspect of choice and the objective relation over sets
may depend on the values the individual or the society attaches to procedural
freedom and objective freedom in the particular context to be analyzed. (PP)
and (ORP) simply display two particular ways of managing the trade-offs be-
tween the procedural aspect of choice and the information of the objective
freedom given by %. According to (PP) procedural aspects are always prior-
itized in order to evaluate overall freedom, while according to (ORP) always
objective freedom aspects are prioritized.
Since we are interested in freedom preserving relations (i.e. relations
that satisfy (OF) and (PF)), a question that immediately arises concerns the
compatibility of such relations with (PP) and (ORP), respectively.
On the one hand, a relation on procedure-based opportunity sets can be
freedom preserving and satisfy (ORP). In such a case we just have a relation
that respects the set inclusion relation not only under a given procedure,
but whatever the procedures associated to the sets are. This follows from
Theorem 2, which requires % to be an extension of the set inclusion relation.
Moreover, such a relation would respect the procedural aspect when the
opportunity sets to be compared are the same.
On the other hand, there is neither tension between (PF) and (PP); actu-
ally, the following proposition shows that (PP) is a stronger version of (PF).
Proposition 1 Let %+ be a reflexive binary relation defined on K. If %+
satisfies (PP), then it also satisfies (PF).
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Proof. Since (PF) is an “if and only if” condition, we have to prove that, if%+
satisfies (PP), then: (1) [iRj]⇒ [(A, i) %+ (A, j)] and (2) [(A, i) %+ (A, j)]⇒
[iRj].
(1) There are two cases: If iP j, then, by (PP), (A, i) Â+ (B, j) holds for
all A,B ∈ X . Taking A = B we have (A, i) Â+ (A, j). On the other hand, if
iIj, then (A, i) ∼+ (A, j) follows from the fact that R is a linear order and
by reflexivity of %+.
(2) Suppose not, i.e. we have (A, i) %+ (A, j) but jP i. Then, by (PP),
(A, j) Â+ (B, i) holds true for all A,B ∈ X . Take A = B. Then we have
(A, j) Â+ (A, i), which is a contradiction.
Now, we will define our two particular classes of procedural extensions:
the first one prioritizes the procedural aspect, while the second one prioritizes
the objective aspect.
Definition 4 Let % be a binary relation defined on X . The procedural
extension %+PP of % that prioritizes the procedural aspect is defined
by:
For all (A, i) , (B, j) ∈ K, (A, i) %+PP (B, j) iff [iP j or (iIj and A % B)].
Definition 5 Let % be a binary relation defined on X . The procedural
extension %+ORP of % that prioritizes the objective aspect is defined
by:
For all (A, i) , (B, j) ∈ K, (A, i) %+ORP (B, j) iff [A Â B or (A ∼ B and iRj)].
The rule %+PP pays attention first to the procedure that is associated to
the corresponding opportunity set. Thus, the set that is associated to a better
procedure is declared better, and if the procedure that is associated to both
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sets is the same, then the comparison of the procedure-based opportunity sets
is directly given by the comparison of the (non-procedure-based) opportunity
sets. The rule %+ORP is somehow the dual of %+PP : it respects first the relation
over the (non-procedure-based) opportunity sets, and only if two opportunity
sets are indifferent then the better procedure counts.
Note that the structure of both %+PP and %+ORP is constrained by the
structure of the primitive relation %. For example, %+PP (%+ORP ) will be a
complete preorder (i.e. a reflexive, complete and transitive binary relation)
if and only if % is a complete preorder.
The main purpose of this section is to provide axiomatic characteriza-
tions of %+PP and %+ORP . Such axiomatic characterizations will be, obviously,
linked closely to the axiomatic structure of the original relation %. In or-
der to formalize this link we need to introduce some additional notation and
definitions.
Let i ∈ Π, %⊆ X×X , and let%i⊆ Xi×Xi be the corresponding procedural
replication of %. Let ξ be a set of axioms that characterizes %. For each
(•) ∈ ξ construct a replication (•)i to be imposed on %i as follows:
(1) whenever (•) refers to any A ∈ X , substitute A by (A, i) ∈ Xi,
(2) whenever (•) refers to % (Â,∼), substitute it by %i (Âi,∼i).
For a given i ∈ Π, ξi will denote the set of replications of axioms in ξ.
Note that the construction of Xi preserves the characteristics of a set,
that is, any function or binary relation that is well defined for sets can be
applied to the elements of Xi (for example, it makes sense to talk about the
cardinality of (A, i), or to consider the set (A, i) ∪ (B, i)). This guarantees
that all the syntactic elements of any axiom that is applied on X can be
reproduced on Xi, and that the only difference when replicating an axiom is
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merely semantic.
Theorem 3 Let % be a binary relation defined on X . Let ξ be a set of
axioms that characterize %. Let %+ be a freedom preserving relation on K
that is a procedural extension of %, and let ξ+ = ∪i∈Πξi . Then %+=%+PP if
and only if %+ satisfies ξ+ ∪ {(PP )}.
Proof. ⇒ Let %⊆ X ×X , and let ξ be a set of axioms that characterizes %.
Note that, for all i ∈ Π, the models (ξ,%) and (ξi,%i) are different only in
semantic terms and that, by definition, the replications of the axioms capture
all the semantic differences between the two models. In terms of model
theory, (ξ,%) and (ξi,%i) are isomorphic models. Therefore, the equivalence
[ξ characterize %]⇔ [ξi characterize %i] implies that, if % satisfies ξ, then,
for each i ∈ Π, the procedural replication %i satisfies all axioms in ξi. Given
that %+ is a procedural extension of %, by definition of procedural extension,
%i⊂%+ for all i ∈ Π. Therefore %+ satisfies all axioms in ξ+ = ∪i∈Πξi. By
definition of %+PP , for all A,B ∈ X and for all i, j ∈ Π such that iP j, we
have (A, i) Â+PP (B, j). In other words, %+PP satisfies (PP) as well.
⇐ Suppose that %+ satisfies ξ+ ∪ (PP ) and %+ 6=%+PP . Then, there exist
(A, i), (B, j) such that [iP j or (iIj and A % B)], but not [(A, i) %+ (B, j)]. If
iIj, given that R is a linear ordering, i = j. Then, given that %+ satisfies ξ+
and the models (ξ,%) and (ξi,%i) are isomorphic, we have A %i B ⇔ A % B
for all i ∈ Π and all A,B ∈ X . Therefore, [iIj and A % B] implies
[(A, i) %i(=j) (B, j)] which, because %+ is a procedural extension of %, im-
plies (A, i) %+ (B, j), getting into a contradiction. If iP j, then, by (PP),
(A, i) %+ (B, j), which is a contradiction.
Theorem 4 Let % be a binary relation defined on X . Let ξ be a set of ax-
ioms that characterize %. Let %+ be a freedom preserving transitive relation
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defined on K that is a procedural extension of %, and let ξ+ = ∪i∈Πξi. Then
%+=%+ORP if and only if %+ satisfies ξ+ ∪ {(ORP )}.
Proof. The proof of the only if part is similar to the corresponding part for
Theorem 3. We will prove the if part:
Suppose that %+ satisfies ξ+ ∪ (ORP ) and %+ 6=%+ORP . Then, there exist
(A, i), (B, j) such that (A ∼ B and iRj) or (A Â B) but not (A, i) %+ (B, j).
Given that, for all i ∈ Π the models (ξ,%) and (ξi,%i) are isomorphic, we
have A %i B ⇔ A % B. If (A ∼ B and iRj) or (A Â B) we can distinguish
three cases:
(1) (A ∼ B and iIj): Given that R is a linear ordering, iIj implies i = j.
Then, A ∼ B implies (A, i) ∼i=j (B, i) for all i ∈ Π. Therefore, by definition
of %+, (A, i) ∼+ (B, i), which is a contradiction.
(2) (A ∼ B and iP j). By the implication above (A, i) ∼+ (B, i). Given
that %+ is a freedom preserving relation, it satisfies (PF). By (PF) (B, i) Â+
(B, j), and by transitivity of %+, (A, i) %+ (B, j), which is a contradiction.
(3) A Â B, in which case, by (ORP), (A, i) Â+ (B, j), again a contradic-
tion.
According to Theorems 3 and 4, given an axiomatic characterization ξ
of %, we can characterize two plausible relations over procedure-based op-
portunity sets: the procedural extension of % that prioritizes the procedural
aspect, which is characterized by the set of procedural replications of axioms
in ξ plus (PP); and the procedural extension of % that prioritizes the objec-
tive aspect, which is characterized by the same set of axioms, but substituting
(PP) by (ORP).
Moreover, we should remark that Theorem 3 does not make any assump-
tion on the formal structure of % and %+. It applies for the case in which
both are complete preorders, but in general, as noticed before, the structure
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of %+ will be constrained by the structure of %. However, in order to prove
Theorem 4 we needed the assumption that %+ is transitive.
The next results concern the independence of the axioms.
Theorem 5 Let % be a binary relation defined on X . Let ξ be a non-empty
set of axioms that characterize % , and let ξ+ = ∪i∈Πξi. Then, the axioms
in ξ+∪ (PP ) are independent if and only if the axioms in ξ are independent.
Proof. ⇒ If ξ+ ∪ (PP ) is a set of independent axioms, then any subset of
them is also a set of independent axioms. In particular, for all i ∈ Π, ξi is a
set of independent axioms. Then, by the isomorphism of the models (ξ,%)
and (ξi,%i), ξ is a set of independent axioms.
⇐ Suppose not. Then there exists at least one axiom in ξ+ ∪ (PP ) that
is implied by a subset of the other axioms in ξ+ ∪ (PP ). Assume, without
loss of generality, that (•)k ∈ ξk ⊆ ξ+ is the implied axiom. Let (•) ∈ ξ be
the axiom imposed on % of which (•)k is a replication. Given that axioms in
ξ are independent, then there is %1⊆ X ×X such that %1 satisfies ξ \ {(•)k}
and does not satisfy (•)k. Now, let %2⊆ K ×K be defined as follows:
For all (A, i), (B, j) ∈ K,
(A, i) %2 (B, j) iff

iP j
or
iIj and
 A º B if i 6= k or j 6= k,A º1 B otherwise.
Then, %2 satisfies all the axioms in ξ+ ∪ (PP ) except (•)k. Hence, (•)k
can not be an implied axiom.
Concerning the independence of (PP), let %+ORP be the relation that pri-
oritizes the objective relation associated to %. Then %+ORP satisfies all the
axioms in ξ+ but not (PP).
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Theorem 6 Let % be a binary relation defined on X . Let ξ be a non-empty
set of axioms that characterize % , and let ξ+ = ∪i∈Πξi. Then, the axioms in
ξ+ ∪ (ORP ) are independent if and only if the axioms in ξ are independent.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 5.
We conclude this section with two examples. The first example is that of
the cardinalist ranking of opportunity sets %# introduced by Pattanaik and
Xu (1990) and defined as follows: ∀A,B ∈ X , A %# B iff #A ≥ #B (where
#A(#B) denotes the cardinality of A(B)).
Pattanaik and Xu (1990) characterize the cardinalist ranking by means
of the following three axioms:
• ∀x, y ∈ X, {x} ∼ {y};
• for all distinct x, y ∈ X, {x, y} Â {x};
• ∀A,B ∈ X , and ∀x ∈ X \ (A ∪B), A % B iff A ∪ {x} % B ∪ {x}.
Taking %# as a reference, and considering Theorems 3 and 4, we can de-
fine and characterize, in a procedural framework, the following two rankings
of procedure-based opportunity sets.
Definition 6 The procedural extension %+#PP of the cardinalist rank-
ing that prioritizes the procedural aspect is defined as follows:
For all (A, i) , (B, j) ∈ K, (A, i) %+#PP (B, j) iff [iP j or (iIj and A %# B)].
According to Theorem 3, the rule %+#PP is characterized by the following
axioms:
• ∀x, y ∈ X, ∀i ∈ Π, ({x}, i) ∼+ ({y}, i);
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• for all distinct x, y ∈ X, ∀i ∈ Π, ({x, y}, i) Â+ ({x}, i);
• ∀A,B ∈ X , ∀i ∈ Π, and ∀x ∈ X \ (A ∪ B), [(A, i) %+ (B, i) iff
(A ∪ {x}, i) %+ (B ∪ {x}, i)];
• (PP).
Definition 7 The procedural extension %+#ORP of the cardinalist rank-
ing that prioritizes the objective aspect is defined as follows:
For all (A, i) , (B, j) ∈ K, (A, i) %+#ORP (B, j) iff [A Â# B or (A ∼# B and iRj)].
Similarly, we can axiomatically characterize the rule %+#ORP by means of
the same axioms that characterize %+#PP but substituting (PP) by (ORP).
The second example is that of the leximax ranking of opportunity sets of
Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu (1994). The leximax ranking of opportunity sets
(%LM) is defined in the following way.
Let R∗ be a complete preorder defined on X × X (P ∗ and I∗ denoting
respectively its asymmetric and symmetric factors). For all S ∈ X , #S = r,
let S = {s1, s2, . . . , sr} be such that s1R∗s2R∗ . . . R∗sr. Then, for all A,B ∈
X , A %LM B iff (A = B) or (∃k ∈ {1, . . . ,max{#A,#B}} such that aiI∗bi
for all i < k and [(akP
∗bk) or (ak exists and bk does not exist)]).
Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu (1994) characterize the leximax ranking by
means of the four following axioms:
• ∀x, y ∈ X, xP ∗y ⇒ {x} Â {y};
• for all distinct x, y ∈ X, {x, y} Â {x};
• ∀A,B ∈ X , and ∀x ∈ X \ (A ∪B), A % B iff A ∪ {x} % B ∪ {x};
26
• ∀A,B ∈ X , and ∀x ∈ X \ (A∪B), [A Â B and yP ∗x for all y ∈ A and
zP ∗x for all z ∈ B] ⇒ [A Â B ∪ {x}].
As before, taking %LM as a reference, and considering Theorems 3 and
4, we can define and characterize, in a procedural framework, the following
two rankings of procedure-based opportunity sets:
Definition 8 The procedural extension %+LMPP of the leximax rank-
ing that prioritizes the procedural aspect is defined as follows:
For all (A, i) , (B, j) ∈ K, (A, i) %+LMPP (B, j) iff [iP j or (iIj and A %LM B)].
Definition 9 The procedural extension %+LMORP of the leximax rank-
ing that prioritizes the objective aspect is defined as follows:
For all (A, i) , (B, j) ∈ K, (A, i) %+LMORP (B, j) iff [A ÂLM B or (A ∼LM B and iRj)].
According to Theorem 4, the rule %+LMPP is characterized by the following
axioms:
• ∀x, y ∈ X, ∀i ∈ Π, xP ∗y ⇒ ({x}, i) Â+ ({y}, i);
• for all distinct x, y ∈ X, ∀i ∈ Π, ({x, y}, i) Â+ ({x}, i);
• ∀A,B ∈ X , ∀i ∈ Π, and ∀x ∈ X \ (A ∪ B), (A, i) %+ (B, i) iff (A ∪
{x}, i) %+ (B ∪ {x}, i);
• ∀A,B ∈ X , ∀i ∈ Π, and ∀x ∈ X \ (A ∪ B), [(A, i) Â+ (B, i) and yP ∗x
for all y ∈ A and zP ∗x for all z ∈ B] ⇒ [(A, i) Â+ (B ∪ {x}, i)];
• (PP).
Similarly, we can axiomatically characterize %+LMORP by means of the
same axioms that characterize %+LMPP but substituting (PP) by (ORP).
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6 Final Remarks and Conclusion
In this paper we have considered the question of how to compare procedure-
based opportunity sets in terms of overall freedom, i.e. how to rank sets
of options when there is some procedural aspect associated to the sets that
matters. We have studied the links between comparisons of (non-procedure-
based) opportunity sets and comparisons of procedure-based opportunity
sets.
For example, our first rule %+PP classifies the procedure-based opportu-
nity sets into clusters such that: (1) the sets associated to the same pro-
cedure are in the same cluster; (2) within each cluster the ranking respects
the ranking over the corresponding opportunity sets; (3) a cluster is ranked
higher that another cluster if the first procedure is better that the second
one. Our second rule %+ORP also classifies the procedure-based opportunity
sets into clusters such that: (1) a cluster consists of procedure-based oppor-
tunity sets such that the corresponding opportunity sets are indifferent; (2)
within each cluster the ranking respects the linear order of the procedures;
(3) a procedure-based opportunity set in a cluster is ranked higher than a
procedure-based opportunity set in another cluster by respecting the ranking
of the corresponding opportunity set. With respect to the characterizations
of these rankings, our results allow for taking the corresponding characteri-
zation of the ranking over the opportunity sets and for adding two axioms:
when adding (PP) we have an axiomatic characterization of %+PP , and when
adding (ORP) we have an axiomatic characterization of %+ORP .
As pointed out before, (PP) and (ORP) display particular ways to solve
the trade-offs between the procedural aspect and the information given by
the primitive relation % over opportunity sets. Indeed, they propose a rather
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rough solution. Other procedural extensions of % that do not prioritize
systematically any of both aspects are indeed conceivable.
Presumably, a way to approach those other possible formulae to manage
with the trade-offs is by means of the representation result proposed in The-
orem 1. In such a case, the way a particular ranking over procedure-based
sets solves the trade-offs could be captured by the values of functions f and
v, and by the particular operations to aggregate them. For example, %+#PP
could be interpreted as the case in which f(x) = 1/n for all x ∈ X, v(i) > 1
for all i ∈ Π, and the ranking is represented by the sum of all those val-
ues. %+#ORP could correspond to the case in which f(x) = 1 for all x ∈ X,
v(i) < 1 for all i ∈ Π and, again, we sum all those values. %+LMPP could
be understood as the case in which, for all xi ∈ X, f(xi) >
∑
xiP ∗xj f(xj);
v(i) >
∑
xi∈X f(xi) and the ranking is represented by the sum of all those
values. And %+LMORP could be represented by the sum of values such that
for all xi ∈ X, f(xi) >
∑
xiP ∗xj f(xj), and v(i) < f(xi) for all i ∈ Π.
Note that our understanding of a procedure in this paper is quite general
and abstract, i.e. our work provides a general formal framework for the re-
search on particular procedural aspects and the implications of incorporating
their own ethical and philosophical foundations. On the other hand, the rich-
ness of the informational basis could also refer to the nature of the procedure.
Procedural circumstances pointed out in the Introduction suggest that some
of them have important ethical implications that should be captured by the
way of comparing opportunity sets. In this sense, the reader is referred to
Hansson (1996), Suzumura (1999), and Suzumura and Xu (2001, 2003).
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